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Abstract—With increasing number of antennae in base stations,
there is considerable interest in using beamforming to improve
physical layer security, by creating an ‘exposure region’ that
enhances the received signal quality for a legitimate user and
reduces the possibility of leaking information to a randomly
located passive eavesdropper. The paper formalizes this concept
by proposing a novel definition for the security level of such
a legitimate transmission, called the ‘Spatial Secrecy Outage
Probability’ (SSOP). By performing a theoretical and numerical
analysis, it is shown how the antenna array parameters can affect
the SSOP and its analytic upper bound. Whilst this approach may
be applied to any array type and any fading channel model, it
is shown here how the security performance of a uniform linear
array varies in a Rician fading channel by examining the analytic
SSOP upper bound.
Keywords—Physical layer security, beamforming, exposure re-
gion, spatial secrecy outage probability, uniform linear array.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of wireless communications, there is a
strong need to provide improved level of security at the physi-
cal layer to complement conventional encryption techniques in
the higher layers. Since Wyner established the wiretap channel
model and showed the possibility of approaching Shannon’s
perfect secrecy without a secret key [1], this has been since
extended to various channels, such as non-degraded discrete
memoryless broadcast channels [2], Gaussian wiretap channels
[3], fading channels [4], [5] and multiple antenna channels [6]–
[8].
Wyner’s wiretap channel model requires that the legitimate
user should have a better channel than the adversarial user,
even only for a fraction of realizations in fading channels
[4]. Different users’ locations can provide distinction between
their channels due to the large-scale path loss relying on
user’s distance to the transmitter. However, the role of location
in information-theoretic security research has been largely
ignored, presumably as users are often assumed to be randomly
distributed. With the aid of the stochastic geometry theory, the
distribution of the random users’ locations can be modeled
via Poisson point process (PPP), [9], [10] thus encouraging
the utilization of location in wireless security. For example,
ArrayTrack [11] shows how improving granularity can be
used to enhance security [12]. In [13]–[15], a location-based
beamformer utilizes user’s location to enhance security, which
does not require user’s full channel state information (CSI).
This paper mainly investigates the security threat posed
by a particular adversarial behavior, i.e., passive eavesdrop-
ping, with the classical model where the transmitter (Alice)
wishes to transmit to the legitimate user (Bob) in presence
of PPP distributed eavesdroppers (Eves). Alice is equipped
with antenna array and performs beamforming to enlarge the
difference between Bob’s and Eve’s channels. Beamforming
has been shown to achieve the secrecy capacity in multiple-
input-single-output (MISO) channels [6], [7] and has provoked
a lot of research [16], [17]. Essentially, it is a spatial filter that
focuses energy in a certain direction or suppresses energy in
other directions [18], thereby allowing distinguishing between
locations that are either secure or insecure, for the transmission
to Bob. This is important as many applications require security
inside an enclosed area, such as different zones in an exhibition
hall or different assembly lines in a factory.
In this paper, we consider the scenarios that only Bob’s
location information is available at Alice, as explained in
[13]–[15]. In our previous work [19], [20], beamforming
is used to create an ‘exposure region’ (ER) to protect the
transmission to the legitimate user. However, the ER in [19],
[20] is not based on information-theoretic parameters and lacks
the theoretical analysis. Alternatively, in this paper, the ER
is defined by the physical region where any PPP distributed
Eve causes secrecy outage to the legitimate transmission in a
general channel model, i.e., Rician fading channel. Then, the
spatial secrecy outage probability (SSOP) is defined for the
ER based beamforming, which measures the security level of
the legitimate transmission based on the ER; this enables an
investigation of the role of the array parameters, e.g. number
of elements and the direction of emission (DoE) angle, on
physical layer security.
Related work has attempted to create different sorts of
physical regions to combat the randomness of both Eve’s
location and of the fading channel, e.g., [21]–[23]. Whilst
the term ‘exposure region’ was coined in [21], it referred to
received signal quality instead of secrecy outage and lacked
information-theoretic analysis whereas in other work, [22],
2[23], the antenna array is overlooked in the information-
theoretic analysis. Since beamforming is performed via an-
tenna arrays, the ER created using beamforming is highly
related to the array parameters and can be controlled by
changing the array parameters which in turn, affects the SSOP.
The main contributions of this paper are
• Definition of the new term called SSOP which is based
on the ER where randomly located Eves cause secrecy
outage and which measures the security performance in
fading channel from the spatial perspective and links
with array parameters; it can be applied to existing
research to provide information-theoretic analysis and
enhanced security performance by taking array parame-
ters into consideration;
• A general expression of the upper bound for the SSOP
is obtained to facilitate the theoretical analysis of the
security performance, applicable to any array type and
fading channel model; a closed-from expression of the
upper bound for the SSOP is derived for the uniform
linear array (ULA);
• Based on the SSOP, the first investigation of the secu-
rity performance of ER based beamforming with ULA
in a Rician fading channel with respect to the array
parameters is presented. Numerical results reveals that
in general, the SSOP increases dramatically as Bob’s
angle increases; when the number of elements in the
array increases, the SSOP converges to a certain value
depending on Bob’s angle. As for the upper bound, the
numerical results show that it is tighter for a smaller
number of elements.
The paper is organized as follows. The related work to
physical layer security from the physical region perspective
is surveyed in Section II. In Section III, the system model and
channel models are demonstrated whereas in Section IV, the
ER is established, based on which the SSOP and its analytic
upper bound are derived. The SSOP for the ULA and for the
Rician channel are analyzed in Sections V and,VI respectively,
along with the tightness of the upper bound. In Section VII,
the conclusions are given.
II. RELATED WORK
Whenever Alice has knowledge of Bob’s CSI or location
information, beamforming can be used to enhance the received
signal quality around Bob and reduce the possibility of leaking
information to Eve. As Eve’s CSI and location information
are generally unknown to Alice, this requires the creation of
a physical region either based on the traditional performance
metrics, e.g., received power or signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio [21], [24]–[28], or information-theoretic parame-
ters, such as secrecy outage probability (SOP) [22], [23], [29]–
[31].
In [24], multiple arrays have been used to jointly create
a region smaller than that of a single array by dividing the
transmitted message and sending it out via multiple arrays in
a time-division manner, so that only the user within the jointly
created region can receive the complete message. This idea was
extended in [21], [25] by encrypting the transmitted message
so that only the user within in the jointly created region could
decrypt it, with interference sent on some arrays to reduce the
effective coverage region. Multiple APs were used in [26] to
jointly perform beamforming with adaptive transmit power to
reduce the joint physical region.
Whilst multiple arrays provide smaller regions, synchroniza-
tion of the arrays and modifications to higher layer protocol
are problematic [24]. In [27], the authors avoid this by using
a single array to create a cross-layer design called a STROBE
that inserts orthogonal interference which is transmitted si-
multaneously with the intended data stream, so that Eve
cannot decode correctly while Bob remains unaffected by the
interference. The work in [28] designed a specific type of
smart array that has two synthesized radiation patterns that can
alternatively transmit in a time-division manner overlapping
in Bob’s direction to provide a full signal transmission whilst
reducing signal quality to Eve.
The work based on the traditional performance metrics lacks
an information-theoretic analysis, although in [21], [25], the
authors define the ER as a performance metric but not using
information-theoretic parameters. Work on insecure and secure
regions using the information-theoretic parameters has been
undertaken on the compromised secrecy region (CSR) [22],
secrecy outage region (SOR) [23] and vulnerability region
(VR) [29], but defined by the region where a certain security
goal is not achieved. On the other hand, the secure regions in
[30], [31] are defined by certain security goal being guaranteed.
Despite of the difference in the definition of the physical
regions, beamforming and/or artificial noise (AN) are used in
the work that is based on information-theoretical parameters,
either in the form of antenna arrays [23], [30], [31] or in the
form of distributed antennas [22], [29].
Most reviewed work provides numerical approximations but
not the closed-form formulation for these physical regions
except [23], [31]. The closed-form formulation of the physical
region or its upper bound in this paper can provide analysis
with respect to the related aspects, such as array parameters,
which can be potentially used for optimization towards higher
level security. In [23], the Rician fading is averaged and
treated as a constant in a very large number of antennas
systems. Rayleigh fading generated from simple expressions
is considered in [31], but it is not practical to obtain Bob’s
CSI or location information without the line-of-sight (LOS)
component. It is worth noticing that almost all the reviewed
work does not investigate the role of the array parameters in
the physical regions. In [13]–[15], the authors consider some
aspect of the array parameters but do not focus on the analysis
of the array parameters.
III. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODELS
Consider secure communications in wireless local access
network, e.g., Wi-Fi, where the access point (AP), Alice,
communicates to a desired receiver (Bob) in presence of
passive eavesdroppers (Eves), as shown in Fig. 1. Suppose that
the AP is equipped with an ULA having N antenna elements
with a spacing ∆d . In this context, it is the common setting
in mobile devices, i.e., Bob and Eves, to have a single
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Fig. 1. An example of a wireless security communications system with one
AP, Bob and homogeneous PPP distributed Eves
antenna due to physical size limitation. Bob and Eves are
simply referred to as a ‘general user’ or a ‘user’ hereinafter,
unless otherwise stated. In this paper, Eves are assumed to
be non-collaborative.
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider that the AP is located at the
origin point in polar coordinates and a user’s coordinates are
denoted by z = (d, θ). For ease of mathematical modeling,
the ULA is aligned on Y-axis with the center at the origin
point. The user’s angle θ in the polar coordinates is also
the angle to the norm of the ULA. Assume that the users
are distributed by a homogeneous PPP, Φe, with density λe
[32]; Bob’s coordinates are denoted by zB = (dB , θB); the ith
Eve’s coordinate is zEi = (dEi, θEi),∀i ∈ N+. The subscripts
‘B’ and ‘E’ are used for Bob and Eves hereinafter.
Given zB , the AP transmits data only towards Bob in the
presence of l randomly distributed Eves in every transmit time
interval. In particular, let x be the modulated symbol with unit
power, E[|x|2] = 1, and Pt be its transmit power. The trans-
mitted vector, denoted by u, is given by u =
√
Ptw
∗x, where
w is the beamforming weight vector, i.e., w = s(θ)/
√
N , and
s(θ) is the array steering vector,
s(θ) = [e−jφ1(θ), ..., e−jφi(θ), ..., e−jφN (θ)]T , (1)
where φi(θ) is the phase shift on the i-th element and
θ ∈ [0, 2pi]. For the ULA, substituting φi(θ) = k∆d(i−1) sin θ
into (1), we obtain the array steering vector of the ULA,
s(θ) = [1, ..., e−jk∆d sin θ(i−1), ..., e−jk∆d sin θ(N−1)]T , (2)
where k = 2pi/λ and λ is the wavelength of the carrier signal
[33]. For the 2.4 GHz Wi-Fi signal, λ = 12.5 cm. Note that
s(θ) in (1) is a general expression for any type of array,
while (2) is the expression just for the ULA. For example,
the expression for a uniform circular array can be obtained
by substituting φi(θ) = kR cos(θ − 2pi(i− 1)/N), where R
is the radius of the circular array. Given Bob’s location
information, θ is set to θB , i.e., w = s(θB)/
√
N .
For a general user at z = (d, θ), denoted by h(z), the
channel gain vector between the AP and user at z can be
decomposed into LOS and non-LOS (NLOS) components, and
is expressed by
h(z) = d−β/2(
√
K
K + 1
s(θ) +
√
1
K + 1
g), (3)
where d−β/2 denotes the large-scale path loss at the distance,
d, and the path loss exponent β ∈ [2, 6]; g = [g1, g2, ..., gN ]T
represents the NLOS component where every gi entry is inde-
pendent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) circularly-symmetric
complex Gaussian random variable with zero mean and unit
variance, i.e., gi ∼ CN (0, 1); K denotes the factor of the
Rician fading. According to (3), the received signal at z can
be obtained by
r(z) = hT (z)u + nW =
√
Pt
dβ
h˜x+ nW , (4)
where nW is the additive white Gaussian noise with zero mean
and variance σ2n and h˜ is the equivalent channel factor, which
is given by
h˜ = (
√
K
K + 1
sT (θ) +
√
1
K + 1
gT )
s∗(θB)√
N
=
√
K
K + 1
G(θ, θB) +
√
1
K + 1
gT s∗(θB)√
N
, (5)
where G(θ, θB) is the array factor. Note that G(θ, θB) in (5)
is a general expression derived from (1) and is also valid
for any type of array. For the ULA, it is given by
G(θ, θB) =
1√
N
N∑
i=1
ejk∆d(sin θB−sin θ)(i−1)
=
1√
N
1− ejNk∆d(sin θB−sin θ)
1− ejk∆d(sin θB−sin θ) . (6)
Remark 1: The array patterns for G(θ, θB) at ±(θB ± pi)
are symmetric to each other. Due to this symmetry property
of the ULA, it suffices to study G(θ, θB) only in θB ∈ [0, pi2 ].
Denoted by γ(z), the received SNR at z, can be found from
(4),
γ(z) =
Pt
σ2nd
β
|h˜|2. (7)
The channel capacity of the general user at z can be given by
C(z) = log2[1 + γ(z)] = log2
(
1 +
Pt
σ2nd
β
|h˜|2
)
. (8)
For convenience, let CB = C(zB) and CEi = C(zEi) denote
the channel capacities of Bob and the i-th Eve hereinafter. Due
to the fact that |h˜|2 scales with G(θ, θB), a proper design of
G(θ, θB) can improve CB while decreasing CEi.
4IV. EXPOSURE REGION AND SPATIAL SECRECY OUTAGE
PROBABILITY
From (8), it can be noticed that CEi relies on random
location zEi and the small-scale fading h˜. As a result, one or
more Eves could have a higher channel capacity than a certain
threshold, leading to the secrecy outage [34]. For given Eves’
random locations, the exposure region (ER) is mathematically
formulated to characterize the above secrecy outage event.
Then the SOP with respect to the ER is evaluated as a measure
of the security level. An upper bound expression for the SSOP
is derived to facilitate theoretical analysis.
A. Exposure Region
Let RB and Rs be the rate of the transmitted codewords
and the rate of the confidential information, respectively. As in
[34], we assume the following statements. We differentiate
a secrecy outage and a unreliable transmission, i.e., a data
outage when CB < RB . In this paper, we only focus
on a secrecy outage event, given that CB ≥ RB . Notice
that the data outage event, given that CB < RB , is the
typical outage with no secrecy and thus no secrecy outage.
Accordingly, this data outage is not part of the secrecy
outage and is out of our scope. Secrecy outage event occurs
when Eve’s channel capacity is higher than the difference
RB −Rs conditioned on CB ≥ RB , and the probability of
such an event is the SOP.
The geometric meaning is lacking in the above definition of
SOP in [34]. To characterize the secrecy outage event for the
PPP distributed Eves, the ER, denoted by Θ, is defined by the
geometric region only where Eves cause the secrecy outage
event, i.e., CEi > RB −Rs,∃zEi = (d, θ) ∈ Θ. Accordingly,
Θ can be represented by
Θ = {z : C(z) > RB −Rs} conditioned on CB ≥ RB . (9)
The ith Eve will cause secrecy outage, if and only if zEi ∈ Θ.
At the same time, CB ≥ RB needs to be guaranteed.
Substituting (8) into (9) and rearranging d and θ, Θ can be
transformed into
Θ = {z = (d, θ) : d < D(θ)} conditioned on CB ≥ RB ,
(10)
where
D(θ) =
[ Pt|h˜|2
σ2n(2
RB−RS − 1)
] 1
β
, (11)
D(θ) is a function only of θ for a given θB and the contour of
Θ. All locations within D(θ) have C(z) > RB −Rs, giving a
clear geometric meaning, as shown in Fig. 2. It can be shown
from (11) that D(θ) (i.e., the shape of Θ) is mainly determined
by |h˜|2. Thus, Θ is a dynamic region with shifting boundary
whenever |h˜|2 varies. When the channel is deterministic, D(θ)
is also deterministic.
It is worth noticing that in Fig. 2, Bob should be located
inside the dashed line, i.e., CB ≥ RB . Since RB and Rs
are system parameters that are constant, there is a fixed
Bob
AP
sB RRzC )(
BRzC )(
is the contour of)(D 
Fig. 2. Illustration of the ER Θ. D(θ) is the contour of Θ for given θB ,
which corresponds to C(z) = RB − Rs; Bob should be within the curve
C(z) = RB to guarantee a reliable transmission.
relationship between the dashed line and D(θ). In this
paper, the ER enclosed by D(θ) is of more interest.
Denoted by A, the quantity of Θ can be measured by the
inner area of D(θ). Using (11), A in polar coordinates can be
expressed by,
A =
1
2
∫ 2pi
0
D2(θ) dθ
=
1
2
[ Pt
σ2n(2
RB−RS − 1)
] 2
β
∫ 2pi
0
(|h˜|2) 2β dθ. (12)
A is measured in m2 and depends on |h˜|2 which can be a
function of G(θ, θB) in the following.
Lemma 1: |h˜|2 can be decomposed by
|h˜|2 = KG
2(θ, θB)
K + 1
+
g2Re + g
2
Im
K + 1
+
2
√
KG(θ, θB)
K + 1
gRe,
(13)
where gRe and gIm are the real and imaginary part of a
complex Gaussian random variable g ∼ CN (0, 1). So, gRe
and gIm are joint normal distributed variables, i.e., gRe, gIm ∼
N (0, 12 ).
Proof: In (5), let g be the following substitution.
g =
gT s∗(θB)√
N
(14)
where sH(θB) is deterministic and each element of g is an
i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variable with zero mean and
unit variance. Therefore, g is a complex Gaussian variable,
g ∼ CN (0, 1).
Let gRe and gIm denote the real and imaginary part of g,
where gRe and gIm are joint normal variables, i.e., gRe, gIm ∼
N (0, 12 ). Thus,
h˜ =
√
K
K + 1
G(θ, θB) +
√
1
K + 1
gRe + j
√
1
K + 1
gIm.
(15)
Then, |h˜|2 can be obtained by
|h˜|2 =
[√ K
K + 1
G(θ, θB) +
√
1
K + 1
gRe
]2
+
1
K + 1
g2Im
=
KG2(θ, θB)
K + 1
+
g2Re + g
2
Im
K + 1
+
2
√
KG(θ, θB)gRe
K + 1
.
(16)
5A reliable transmission is guaranteed for Bob, if Bob is
inside the dashed curve in Fig. 2, i.e., CB > RB . A secrecy
outage event only occurs when zEi ∈ Θ. Intuitively, given that
Bob’s reliable transmission is guaranteed, the smaller A is, the
smaller number of Eves are statistically located in Θ, leading
to less occurrence of the secrecy outage.
B. Spatial Secrecy Outage Probability
Any Eve at zEi ∈ Θ causes CEi > RB − Rs and this
is referred to as a spatial secrecy outage (SSO) event with
respect to the ER. The spatial secrecy outage probability
(SSOP) can be defined by the probability that any Eve is
located inside Θ. To the best of our knowledge, the SSOP
provides distinctive measure of the ER based security over
the conventional SOP which does not have dynamic geometric
implication; the SSOP emphasizes the secrecy outage caused
by the spatially distributed Eves within a dynamic Θ.
We quantify the SSOP, denoted by p, to measure the secrecy
performance. Particularly for given PPP-distributed Eves, the
probability that m Eves are located inside Θ (with its area
quantity A) is given by
Prob{m Eves in Θ} = (λeA)
m
m!
e−λeA. (17)
Using (12) and (17), p can be quantitatively measured by
referring to ‘no secrecy outage’ event that no Eves are located
inside Θ and is given by
p = 1− Prob{0 Eve in Θ} = 1− e−λeA. (18)
It can be seen from (18) that p decreases along with A
and λe. The smaller p is, the more secure transmission
to Bob is. The physical meaning is that a smaller ER or
less number of potential Eves lead to less spatial secrecy
outage occurrence.
Notice that p in (18) depends on the equivalent channel
factor h˜ via A. Due to the fact that h˜ is random channel
fading, it is more interesting to study the expectation of p,
which reflects the averaged SSOP, which is denoted by p¯ and
can be calculated by
p¯ = E|h˜|[p] = 1− E|h˜|[e−λeA]. (19)
Theorem 1: Given A in (12), p¯ in (19) can be expressed by
(19) to (21) at the top of the page, where λe is the density of
Eves, c0 = Ptσ2n(2RB−RS−1) is deterministic, β is the path loss
exponent, K is the Rician factor, G(θ, θB) is the array factor
when the DoE angle is Bob’s angle θB . G(θ, θB) is a general
array factor expression, based on which we can state that
the definition of p¯ applies to any array type.
Proof: First, substituting c0 into (12), A can be simplified
into
A =
1
2
∫ 2pi
0
(c0|h˜|2) 2β dθ. (23)
Substituting (13) and (23) into (19), p¯ can be calculated by
(23) at the top of the page. For normal distribution,
fgRe(x) =
1√
pi
e−x
2
, (25)
fgIm(y) =
1√
pi
e−y
2
. (26)
(19) can be obtained by substituting (25) and (26) into (23).
Take the limit of K → ∞ and K → 0, (20) and (21) can be
obtained, respectively. Thus, the proof is completed.
It is worth pointing out that for the deterministic channel
(K → ∞), p¯ in (20) is mainly decided by G(θ, θB), while
for the Rayleigh channel (K = 0), p¯ in (21) is shown
not to contain G(θ, θB), as there is no LOS component in
Rayleigh fading channel. p¯ in Theorem 1 is complex and can
be numerically calculated. However, it is not tractable to obtain
in closed-form expression, except for the deterministic channel
when β = 2. In the next subsection, upper bound expression
for p¯ will be derived in closed-form to facilitate detailed
theoretical analysis.
C. Upper Bound Expression for Averaged SSOP
To obtain the analytic upper bound expression, consider two
major obstacles. First, let Xθ = c0|h˜|2. A in (12) can be
written in terms of Xθ as
A =
1
2
∫ 2pi
0
X
2
β
θ dθ. (27)
Xθ relies on the array factor G(θ, θB). It is not straightforward
to solve the integral when β > 2. The other obstacle is that
Eh˜[e
−λeA] in (19) is not mathematically tractable due to the
composite array factor and Rician fading channels.
To overcome the aforementioned obstacles, we aim to obtain
the moments of |h˜|2. Denoted by p¯up, the upper bound for p¯
can be obtained via the moments of |h˜|2 using two instances
of Jensen’s Inequality.
E[eX ] ≥ eE[X], (28)
where X is a random variable. The equality holds if and only if
X is a deterministic value. The other one involved is expressed
by
E[X
2
β ] ≤ (E[X]) 2β , (29)
where X is a random variable and β ≥ 2. The equality holds
when β = 2 for any X .
Theorem 2: For given λe and K, p¯up can be derived using
(28) and (29) and is expressed by
p¯up =

1− exp
{
− λepic
2
β
0
[ KA0
2pi(K + 1)
+
1
(K + 1)
] 2
β
}
, K ∈ (0,∞)(30)
1− exp
[
− λepi
( c0
2pi
A0
) 2
β
]
, K =∞ (31)
1− exp(−λepic
2
β
0 ), K = 0, (32)
6p¯ =

1−
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
{
− λe
2
c
2
β
0
∫ 2pi
0
[KG2(θ, θB)
K + 1
+
x2 + y2
K + 1
+
2
√
KG(θ, θB)
K + 1
x
] 2
β
dθ
}e−(x2+y2)
pi
dxdy, K ∈ (0,∞) (19)
1− exp
{
− λe
2
c
2
β
0
∫ 2pi
0
[G2(θ, θB)]
2
β dθ
}
, K =∞ (20)
1−
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
{
− λepic
2
β
0 (x
2 + y2)
2
β
}e−(x2+y2)
pi
dxdy, K = 0, (21)
p¯ = EgRe,gIm [p] = 1−
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
{
− λe
2
c
2
β
0
∫ 2pi
0
[KG2(θ, θB) + x2 + y2 + 2√KG(θ, θB)x
K + 1
] 2
β
dθ
}
fgRe(x)fgIm(y) dx dy.
(23)
where A0 denotes the pattern area and is given by,
A0 =
∫ 2pi
0
G2(θ, θB) dθ (33)
= 2pi + 4pi
N−1∑
n=1
N − n
N
J0(k∆dn) cos(k∆dn sin θB),
(34)
where J0(x) is the Bessel function of the first kind with order
zero, and k = 2pi/λ is a constant.
Proof: see Appendix A.
It is worth mentioning that A0 in (33) is a general
expression to be applied to any type of array (e.g.,
linear array, circular array). For the ULA, we can find
approximations for the expression of A0 in (34), because
J0(x) has a decreasing envelope with the maximum value
J0(0) = 1 at x = 0, and approaches zero when x increases.
This will facilitate the analytical analysis for p¯up, which in
turn provides guidance for the analysis of p¯, especially
if p¯up is close to p¯. Notice that for other array types,
this method of analyzing p¯up to obtain an insight of the
properties of p¯ still works. If closed-form expressions, such
as in (34), do not exist, appropriate approximations or
numerical results can be used based on the particular form
of given G(θ, θB).
Remark 2: Notice that the inequalities in (28) and (29) are
used to derive p¯up. When K = ∞ and β = 2, the equality
holds for both (28) and (29); thus, p¯up = p¯. This can be verified
by substituting β = 2 into (20) and (31). Similarly, when
K = ∞, the equality holds only for (28); thus, p¯up is tighter
when β = 2 than that when β > 2 according to (29). When
β = 2, the equality holds only for (29); thus, p¯up is tighter
for K = ∞ than that for K < ∞ according to (28). For
other cases, the tightness of p¯up is not straightforward. The
numerical results of p¯up for different K and β will be given
in Section VI-B.
Remark 3: Both p¯ in (19)-(21) and p¯up in (30)-(32) are
positively correlated with the transmit power Pt via c0. It is
worth noticing that Pt influences the SSOP being independent
of the array parameters (N and θB). Therefore, in this paper,
when studying the impact of the array parameters, Pt is treated
as constant within the constant c0.
V. IMPACT OF ULA PARAMETERS ON AVERAGED SSOP
The closed-form expression of A0 in (34) includes ULA
parameters, i.e., N, θB ,∆d. In this paper, we take the
commonly used setting ∆d = 0.5λ as an example and focus
on the impact of N and θB on A0 and thus the averaged
SSOP p¯. The analyzing method is the same for other values
of ∆d, but the results will be different. First, we consider
the asymptotic case when K → ∞ and N → ∞. As stated
in Remark 2, when K → ∞ and β = 2, we have p¯up = p¯.
According to (20) and (31), it gives
p¯ = p¯up = 1− exp(−λec0
2
A0). (35)
As seen in (35), p¯up (i.e., p¯) monotonically increases with
A0. Thus, it suffices to analyze the behavior of A0. Detailed
numerical results for p¯ and p¯up for generalized values of K
and β will be shown in Section VI-A.
A. Impact of θB
As stated in Remark 1, the range of θB ∈ [0, pi2 ] is concerned.
First, let A0,n, for n = 1, ..., N−1, denote the summation term
in (34) and it is given by
A0,n = 4pi
N − n
N
J0(k∆dn) cos(k∆dn sin θB). (36)
When ∆d = 0.5λ, (36) can be written as
A0,n = 4pi
N − n
N
J0(npi) cos(npi sin θB). (37)
Using (34) and (37), A0 can be represented by
A0 = 2pi +
N−1∑
n=1
A0,n
= 2pi + 4pi
N−1∑
n=1
N − n
N
J0(npi) cos(npi sin θB) (38)
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Fig. 3. Behavior of J0(npi) and N−nN J0(npi) in A0,n for n ≤ N − 1
when N = 8 antenna elements are used. As n increases, both terms become
less significant in A0 (i.e., p¯up).
When N = 8 and ∆d = 0.5λ, the envelope of the
components in (38) is shown in Fig. 3. In the upper plot of
Fig. 3, J0(npi) is shown to decrease as n. The lower plot
depicts the decreasing envelope of A0,n, i.e., N−nN J0(npi),
with n. When n = 1, A0,1 is the largest; when n = 7, A0,7 is
negligible.
As a result, for given N , we can approximate A0 by
considering the first few dominant terms. Especially in the
case when ∆d = 0.5λ, A0,1 is dominant and it suffices to
approximate A0 using only A0,1, i.e.,
A0 ≈ 2pi + 4piN − 1
N
J0(pi) cos(pi sin θB)
= 2pi +O(J0(pi) cos(pi sin θB)). (39)
Using (35) and (39), when K →∞, p¯up can be asymptotically
approximated by
lim
K→∞
p¯up = 1− exp{−λec0pi −O(J0(pi) cos(pi sin θB))},
(40)
where O(·) denotes the big O notation.
From (39) and (40), it can be seen that for any given N , p¯up
increases along with θB in the range θB ∈ [0, pi/2], because
cos(pi sin θB) decreases from 1 to −1 when θB increases from
0 to pi2 and J0(pi) < 0 as illustrated by the upper plot in Fig. 3.
Physically, the main beam width of the array pattern for
a ULA with ∆d = 0.5λ increases with θB ∈ [0, pi/2], which
leads to an increase in A0 and thus p¯up and p¯.
Fig. 4 depicts the impact of θB on A0,n and p¯up. In
particular, A0,n is the components of A0, which p¯up relies on
according to (35). For the illustrations, we use the ULA with
N = 8 and ∆d = 0.5λ. In the left plot, A0,1 among A0,n,
for n = {1, 2, 3}, has the largest variation from θB = 0◦ to
θB = 90
◦. The variation of A0,n in θB ∈ [0, pi/2] becomes
smaller at larger n.
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In the right plot of Fig. 4, the exact p¯up is shown in
comparison to its various approximations: when n = 1, the
approximated p¯up in (40) is used, which relies on A0,1; when
n = {1, 2}, the approximated p¯up in (35) relies on A0,n in
(38), and so forth. It can be seen in Fig. 4 that when n = 1,
the approximation already captures the increasing trend of the
exact value. With more values of A0,n, the approximation
becomes closer to the exact value.
It is worth noticing from Fig. 4 that A0,n, for n > 2, is not
monotonic in the range θB ∈ [0, pi2 ]. However, for n > 2, A0,n,
is less dominant than A0,1. Overall, the exact value of p¯up is
depicted to have a monotonic increasing relationship with θB
in general.
B. Impact of N
When N changes, the number of summation terms in (38)
as well as its own term envelope |A0,n|, are also influenced.
Therefore, we analyze A0 with respect to N for a given θB by
obtaining another approximation of A0. Let A0 in (38) have
A0,n = 4pi
N−n
N qn, where {qn} is an series for given θB and
n ∈ N+, i.e.,
qn = J0(k∆dn) cos(k∆dn sin θB). (41)
Examples of {qn} when ∆d = 0.5λ are illustrated in
Fig. 5. For the three different values of θB ∈ {0◦, 30◦, 60◦},
it can be seen in Fig. 5 that the behavior of {qn} differs
greatly. When θB = 0◦, qn = J0(npi) are discrete samples
of J0(x). When θB = 30◦, qn = J0(npi) cos(npi2 ) is zero
for odd n; and (−1)n/2J0(x) for even n. When θB = 60◦,
qn = J0(npi) cos(
n
√
3pi
2 ).
When N is sufficiently large, N−nN becomes negligible for
larger n; qn also approaches zero as n increases, as illustrated
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Fig. 5. Behavior of qn versus for θB ∈ {0◦, 30◦, 60◦}.
in Fig. 5. In this case, only A0,n, for n ≤ Nup ≤ N − 1
needs to be considered. Thus, the asymptotic expression when
N →∞ can be expressed by
lim
N→∞
A0 ≈ 2pi + 4pi
Nup∑
n=1
N − n
N
qn
= 2pi + 4pi
Nup∑
n=1
qn. (42)
The particular value of Nup, larger than which qn is negligible,
is subject to practical requirement. According to (42), we can
asymptotically have
lim
N→∞
p¯up ≈ 1− exp{−λec0
2
(2pi + 4pi
Nup∑
n=1
qn)}, (43)
where |qn|  1 for n > Nup.
Fig. 6 depicts the impact of N on p¯up for various θB ∈
{0◦, 30◦, 60◦}. It can be seen from this figure that when N
increases, p¯up fluctuates at different rate for different θB . In
addition, it can be observed that for any θB , p¯up approaches to
a fixed value when N grows sufficiently large. This validates
the asymptotic expression in (42).
VI. SIMULATIONS AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulations and numerical results
for p¯ and p¯up of the ER based beamforming over the Rician
channel with any K ≥ 0 and β = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} with respect
to N and θB .
A. SSOP and Its Upper Bound
In (30), p¯up is positively correlated with
[
c0K
2pi(K+1)A0 +
c0
K+1
] 2
β
. For any fixed β and K, p¯up also has a positive
relationship with A0. Thus, the conclusions that are reached
N
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
U
p
p
er
b
o
u
n
d
o
f
a
v
er
a
g
ed
S
S
O
P
p¯
u
p
×10-3
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
3.2
3.4
3.6
θB = 0
◦
θB = 30
◦
θB = 60
◦
Fig. 6. p¯up versus N for Bob’s angle θB ∈ {0◦, 30◦, 60◦}. ∆d = 0.5λ,
Pt/σ2n = 15 dB, RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1× 10−4
about A0 regarding to the impact of N and θB also apply to
p¯up for different β and K.
For convenience, let A1 denote c0K2pi(K+1)A0 +
c0
K+1 . When β
increases from 2 to 6, A
2
β
1 decreases, because A1 is generally
larger than 1. It is also noticed that when A0 = 2pi, K factor
disappears, i.e., A1 = c0. When A0 < 2pi, the larger K is, the
smaller A1 (i.e., p¯up) is; when A0 > 2pi, the larger K is, the
larger A1 (i.e., p¯up) is.
In Fig. 7, the examples of p¯up for different K and β are
given for three typical values of A0, i.e., 4.1326, 2pi and
15.3761, which corresponds to θB = 0◦, 48.35◦ and 90◦ when
N = 8. The logarithm scale is used to clearly show the ranges
of p¯up and K. It can be seen that, when β increases, p¯up
drops. For fixed β, p¯up increases, stays unchanged or decreases
depending on the value of A0.
The range of K in linear scale is from 0.01 to 50. When
K = 0.01, the Rician channel approaches the Rayleigh channel
(K = 0). When K = 50, the Rician channel approaches the
deterministic channel (K = ∞). It can be seen that for fixed
β, p¯up is a constant for K = 0 and is irrelevant to A0 (nor N ,
θB), as shown in (21) and (32). When K > 10, p¯up approaches
to a certain value that depends on A0 which in turn depends
on N and θB .
The above analysis of the properties of p¯up serves as a coarse
guidance for that of p. In the following, precise numerical
results are used to show the properties of p¯, which cannot be
easily analyzed according to (19). First, the simulation results
are provided to validate the expressions of p¯ in (19) to (21)
which are derived from the expression in (19) which contains
Gaussian random variables via |h˜2| according to (12) and (13).
We choose K = 10 and β = 3 as an example to compare
the numerical results based on the expression in (19) and the
simulation results based on the expression in (19). For the
simulations, 1 × 104 samples are generated for gRe and gIm
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in (13). The simulation and numerical results plotted in Fig. 8
show a good match between them, which verifies the validity
of the expressions in (19) to (21).
An example of p¯ versus θB for β = 3 and N = 8 is given in
Fig. 9. β = 3 is a typical value for some indoor scenarios such
as home and factory [35]. Typical values of K are chosen as
0, 1, 10 and ∞. In addition, p¯up is also shown.
It can be seen that p¯ and p¯up increase in the range θB ∈
[0, pi2 ], except for K = 0. When K = 0, the curves are flat
because p¯ and p¯up are irrelevant to θB , according to (21) and
(32). By comparing p¯up and p¯, it can be observed that the
upper bound reflects the trend very well. It can also be seen
that for both p¯ and p¯up, the curve for K = 10 is closer to that
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for K = ∞, while the curve for K = 1 is closer to that for
K = 0.
For completeness, Fig. 10 shows an example of p¯ and p¯up
versus N for β = 3 and θB = 0◦. It can be seen that p¯ and p¯up
decrease to different floor levels depending on K. The same
behavior has been shown in Fig. 6 where K =∞ and β = 2.
However, it can also be seen that p¯ converges with a much
slower speed, leading to an increasing larger gap between p¯
and p¯up as N increases.
In summary, the properties of A0 with respect to N and θB
can be extended to p¯up. As for p¯, while p¯ has similar properties
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to A0 with respect to N and θB , the gaps between p¯ and p¯up
increase as N . Therefore, in the next section, the tightness of
p¯up will be examined.
B. Tightness of Upper Bound
In this section, the tightness of the upper bound is exam-
ined via numerical results with respect to (K,β,N, θB). An
example of p¯ and p¯up for different K and β with N = 8 and
θB = 0
◦ is shown in Fig. 11. At lower region of K, the channel
approaches the Rayleigh channel. Thus, p¯ and p¯up converge
to the certain values that only depend on β according to (21)
and (32). At higher region of K, the channel approaches the
deterministic channel. p¯ and p¯up converge to the certain values
that depend on β and G(θ, θB), according to (20) and (31).
It can also be seen that when β = 2, the curves for p¯ and p¯up
emerge as K increases, which corresponds to p¯ = p¯up for the
deterministic channel. For other values of β, as K increases,
the gaps between p¯ and p¯up increases.
In this section, the ratio between p¯up and p¯ is used to
measure the tightness of p¯up. Let η denote the ratio,
η =
p¯up
p¯
. (44)
η ≥ 1. The smaller value of η, the tighter p¯up is. In Fig. 11, it
can be deduced that η will take the minimum value at K = 0
and approach the maximum value at K = ∞. Thus, in the
following, the extreme cases K = 0 and K = ∞ are used to
study the range of η for different N , θB and β.
In Fig. 12, η is plotted against θB for K = 0 and K = ∞
for all β. The ULA has N = 8 elements and ∆d = 0.5λ. For
Rayleigh channel, both p¯ and p¯up are irrelevant to θB , thus η
is flat across θB ∈ [0, 90◦]. For the deterministic channel when
β = 2, η = 1; when β > 2, η in general decrease with θB .
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Comparing the curves for both the deterministic and the
Rayleigh channels, it is noticed that when β > 2, the ratios
are located closely in a cluster. However, there does not exist
monotonic relationship between η and β. For example, when
β = 6, η for the deterministic channel is smaller than that
when β = 4.
In Fig. 13, η is plotted against N for K = {0,∞} and
β ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. The ULA has ∆d = 0.5λ and θB = 0◦.
For the Rayleigh channel, η is flat across N for all β. For
the deterministic channel, η in general increases with N when
β > 2, which verifies the observation from Fig. 10.
In summary, when β = 2, η decreases with K till the
minimum value η = 1; when β > 2, η increases with K
till certain value that depends on N and θB , and the values
of η for different β stay in a cluster. For given β and K, η
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generally decreases with θB and increases with N . In a lower
region of N , e.g., N < 10, the value of η is smaller than 2.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has investigated secure wireless communications
whereby a ULA in Alice communicates to Bob in the pres-
ence of PPP distributed Eves. Particularly, we mathematically
defined ER to characterize spatial secrecy outage event and
proposed the ER based beamforming over a Rician fading
channel. As for the analysis of the ER, the analytic expression
of the pattern area was also derived in form of Bessel function
and two different approximations were adopted to analyze
how the Bobs angle and the number of element of the ULA
quantify the ER. Using the ER, the SSOP was defined and the
SSOP performance was evaluated, allowing the derivation of
its exact and upper bound closed-form expressions. The impact
of the array parameters on the SSOP was discussed to find that
the SSOP increases dramatically with increasing Bobs angle;
decreases with reducing ER; and approaches certain level with
increasing number of antenna elements. Simulations and the
numerical results validated our analysis and examined the
tightness of the upper bound expressions. Since the definitions
of the ER and the SSOP were generalized to be applicable to
any array type, the results can be useful to various antenna
array types in future wireless security systems. In this work,
we assumed that Eves are non-collaborative. For future
work, collaboration between Eves could be investigated.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
According to (19) and (28), it can be derived that
p¯ = 1− E|h˜|[e−λeA] ≤ 1− e−λeE|h˜|[A]. (45)
Notice that A depends on random variable h˜ and is not
constant, except for K = ∞. Thus, the equality holds only
for deterministic channels.
To solve (45), assume that θ ∼ U(0, 2pi). According to (27),
A in (45) can be converted into
A = 2pi
1
2
∫ 2pi
0
1
2pi
X
2
β
θ dθ = piEθ[X
2
β
θ ]. (46)
According to (29), (46) is bounded by
A ≤ pi(Eθ[Xθ]) 2β = pi
(∫ 2pi
0
1
2pi
Xθ dθ
) 2
β
. (47)
In the inequality, the equality holds when β = 2 for any K.
According to (45) and (47), it can be derived that
E|h˜|[A] ≤ piE|h˜|
[( ∫ 2pi
0
1
2pi
Xθ dθ
) 2
β
]
. (48)
Then applying (29) and (48), it can be derived that
piE|h˜|
[( ∫ 2pi
0
1
2pi
Xθ dθ
) 2
β
]
≤ pi
(
E|h˜|
[ ∫ 2pi
0
1
2pi
Xθ dθ
]) 2
β
.
(49)
Exchanging the integral and E|h˜|, then substituting Xθ =
c0|h˜|2, it can be derived that
E|h˜|[A] ≤ pi
( c0
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
E|h˜|[|h˜|2] dθ
) 2
β
. (50)
Notice that when β = 2, the equality holds.
Apply (50) to (45) then obtain
p¯ ≤ 1− e−λeE|h˜|[A]
≤ 1− exp
[
− λepi
( c0
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
E|h˜|[|h˜|2] dθ
) 2
β
]
. (51)
The upper bound p¯up can be expressed by
p¯up = 1− exp
[
− λepi
( c0
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
E|h˜|[|h˜|2] dθ
) 2
β
]
. (52)
According to (13), E|h˜|[|h˜|2] = KG
2(θ,θB)+1
K+1 . Substituting the
previous result into (52), (30) can be obtained.
For special cases, take the limit of K → ∞ and K → 0,
(20) and (21) can be obtained.
For the ULA, (33) can be further derived according to (6).
A0 =
∫ 2pi
0
1
N
∑
i,j
ejk∆d(sin θB−sin θ)(i−j) dθ
=
1
N
∑
i,j
ejk∆d sin θB(i−j)
∫ 2pi
0
e−jk∆d sin θ(i−j)dθ. (53)
According to the integral representation of the Bessel function
of the first kind, Jn(x) = 12pi
∫ pi
−pi e
j(nτ−x sin τ)dτ , (53) can be
further derived by
A0 =
2pi
N
∑
i,j
J0(k∆d(i− j))ejk∆d(i−j) sin θB , (54)
where A0 is the summation of N×N terms. To further simplify
(54), each of which is denoted by A0,i,j ,
A0,i,j =
2pi
N
J0(k∆d(i− j))ejk∆d(i−j) sin θB . (55)
Notice that the only variable across all A0,i,j is the difference
i− j. So let n = i− j and it can be derived that
A0,n =
2pi
N
J0(k∆dn)e
jk∆dn sin θB . (56)
Then, all the values of n that are associated with A0,n are
mapped into a table shown in Fig. 14.
Observing the table in Fig. 14, it is noticed that i) the terms
of A0,n on the diagonal lines can be combined, because they
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Fig. 14. Table for A0,i,j shows the symmetry regarding to the diagonal line
i = j
are the same; ii) becuase Jm(−x) = (−1)mJm(x), the terms
of A0,n that have the same absolute value of n can be added
A0,n +A0,−n
=
2pi
N
[J0(k∆dn)e
jk∆dn sin θB + J0(−k∆dn)e−jk∆dn sin θB ]
=
4pi
N
J0(k∆dn) cos(k∆dn sin θB). (57)
In addition, when n = 0, J0(0) = 1 and ej0 = 1. Thus,
A0,0 =
2pi
N . Now, sum up the terms of A0,n on each diagonal
lines from n = 0 to p = N − 1 and obtain
A0 = 2pi + 4pi
N−1∑
n=1
N − n
N
J0(k∆dn) cos(k∆dn sin θB).
(58)
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